H. KEITH HENSON 1794 Cardel Way San Jose, CA 95124 (408) 978-7616 THOMAS K. DONALDSON 1410 Norman Dr. Sunnyvale, CA 94087 (408) 732-4234 ROGER E. GREGORY 2040 Columbia St. Palo Alto, CA 94306 (415) 493-7582 U. S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K. ) DONALDSON, and ROGER E. GREGORY, ) on behalf of themselves and as ) representatives of others ) COMPLAINT FOR similarly affected, ) DECLARATORY ) JUDGEMENT Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) No. ) ) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ) ENFORCEMENT OF RON HELLER, U. S. ATTORNEY OFFICE ) PROVISIONS OF THE Los Angeles, MICHAEL EMICK, and ) ELECTRONIC DOES 1 TO 100, inclusive, ) COMMUNICATION ) PRIVACY ACT. ) Defendants. ) CLASS ACTION ) INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 1. On or about January 12, 1988 law enforcement officials of Riverside County obtained plaintiffs' electronic communications (electronic mail, email). From that date to present plaintiffs have been prevented authorized access to their electronic communications. Plaintiff Henson contacted the FBI by phone in March 1988 and requested the FBI to investigate this apparent violation of Federal law (Title 18, Section 2701 et seq.) in a letter to Supervisor of Riverside COMPLAINT 1 FBI Office Ron Heller April 5, 1988. (Attachment A). Request was referred by the FBI without field investigation to the U. S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles. This office, following the disinclination of the FBI to investigate, professed disinterest. Plaintiff Henson was informed of "declined to prosecute" decision of U. S. Attorney's office via telephone by Mr. Heller. With advice from the other plaintiffs, Henson responded to Mr. Heller (Attachment B) and also wrote Michael Emick, Chief of Criminal Complaints, U. S. Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, California on April 25. (Attachment C). In a subsequent telephone call, Mr. Emick's assistant Mr. Medrano promised a letter would be sent to Plaintiff Henson supporting claim by U.S. Attorney's office that provisions of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act were not violated, or providing other reason(s) for declining prosecution. In spite of attempts through Representative Norman M. Mineta and Senator Pete Wilson (Attachments D, E, & F), and follow-up phone calls, no substantive response to plaintiff's complaint re the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 has been received to the date of filing, from an FBI or Justice Department representative (Attachments G, H, & I). JURISDICTION 2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to U.S.C. 28, Sections 2201, 1331, and 1346. PARTIES 3. Plaintiffs H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K. DONALDSON and ROGER E. GREGORY are citizens of the United States, residents of Santa Clara County, and were current users of electronic COMPLAINT 2 mail service provided by Alcor Life Extension Foundation on January 12, 1988. 4. Named defendants are agencies and employees of the Government of the United States. CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGATIONS 5. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and the other users of electronic mail who had their correspondence stored in this computer. There are between 50 and 100 people in this class. Some of them are not California residents, and at least one of them is a citizen of another country. All are entitled to protection under the provisions of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act. A comprehensive list of the members of this class cannot be obtained until the computer in which the list resides has been returned. An additional class is all users of electronic mail in the United States who are entitled to privacy and Fourth Amendment protection via the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. This last class is so numerous as to make the joinder of all members of the class completely impracticable. However, due to the unique nature of the class, notification of, and email replies from, a substantial fraction of this class could be accomplished economically by posting notice on the computer networks. Eleven thousand people are reported to read the Usenet news group "misc.legal." Plaintiffs will offer the widespread members of this class an opportunity to join the action if instructed to do so by the Court. COMPLAINT 3 FACTS 6. On or about January 12, 1988 certain law enforcement agents (coroner's deputies) obtained and executed a warrant to remove computers and related equipment from Alcor Life Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., Riverside, CA 92503. (Attachment J) 7. One of these computers and a small number of removable disks contained plaintiffs' electronic communications as they are defined in the Electronic Communication Privacy Act. 8. Law enforcement agencies in Riverside have prevented authorized access to plaintiffs' electronic mail. An unknown number of law enforcement personnel from the Coroner's Office, the District Attorney's Office, and the Riverside City Police have obtained plaintiffs' electronic communications in electronic storage, and have prevented authorized access to these communications, without Court orders or warrants which would exempt them from the punitive provisions of Title 18, Section 2701(b). 9. The warrant used to remove the computer and prevent authorized access to Plaintiff's electronic mail did not meet the provisions of Title 18, Section 2703. In particular, no warrants were issued which provide for the disclosure or sequestering of plaintiffs' (or any other) electronic mail. 10. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department have refused to either investigate or provide an explanation for why the provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act do not apply. Oral communications COMPLAINT 4 with these agencies have produced the verbal argument that a search warrant issued against a computer used for electronic mail is equivalent to a search warrant issued against a post office, where all mail within the walls of a post office could be opened and read. Plaintiffs' counter arguments that such a warrant would be similar to a "writ of assistance," and that the Fourth Amendment requires "particularly describing" were dismissed as frivolous. 11. Repeated efforts to resolve these issues through administrative channels have failed. This matter has been brought to the attention of this Court only after numerous attempts have been made to obtain a substantive reply as to why clear provisions of the law were deemed not applicable by the FBI and Justice Department. DISCUSSION 12. A substantial part of the reason Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was to balance Fourth Amendment protection for users of electronic mail with the needs of law enforcement agents to access this rapidly growing new form of communications. The Justice Department testified at length to avoid the cumbersome provisions of Court orders needed for telephone taps. Congress went along with the Justice Department and made the seizing of electronic mail by law enforcement agents similar in procedure to that required for seizing first class mail, that is, dependent on a Rule 41 search warrant, or similar State warrant. (See quotes of James Knapp, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, in Attachment C.) COMPLAINT 5 Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice makes it clear that Congress was concerned about law enforcement agencies abusing the Fourth Amendment rights of people who use electronic mail. This is evidenced by testimony about the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by Senator Leahy before the House Subcommittee on September 26, 1985: "There is no adequate legal protection against the unauthorized access of electronic communications system computers to obtain or alter the communications contained in those computers. . . . . "Our bill . . . will help protect private communications from interception by an eavesdropper, whether the eavesdropper is a corporate spy, a police officer without probable cause, or just a plain snoop." The House and Senate Subcommittees wrote into the law only a few exceptions from punishing someone who: ". . . intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which electronic communication service is provided; or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage . . . ." In the case at hand, plaintiffs argue that the coroner's deputies either had no authorization, or exceeded what they had. It is certain that they obtained the email of a number of people, including plaintiffs, uncertain as to their altering COMPLAINT 6 it, and certain that authorized access to plaintiffs' email has been prevented for the past 11 months. Exceptions are provided by the Act in Section 2703 for law enforcement agencies to access electronic communications in situations where they obtain a warrant. To quote the relevant section: "Requirements for governmental access (a) Contents of electronic communications in electronic storage--A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of an electronic communication that is in electronic storage for one hundred eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant" (emphasis added). The requirements for such a warrant were spelled out by James Knapp in his testimony: "The affidavit and judicial authorization should sufficiently specify the people involved, . . ." (emphasis added). The requirement to name "the people involved" places no burden on the law enforcement agency seeking a warrant. In situations (such as this one) where the names of the people with stored electronic communications are not known to the law enforcement agency prior to executing the search warrant and examining the computer files, John Does 1-1000 could be named and an amended warrant filed after the names were extracted from the computer. The plaintiffs are not aware of any warrants, even John Doe warrants, which have been issued against their electronic COMPLAINT 7 communications; it seems clear that our private electronic communications were seized and the provider of electronic communication services (Alcor) was forced to disclose the contents of private email without a warrant. Law enforcement agencies, in particular the FBI, have orally supported two lines of reasoning for legally seizing and denying access to our electronic communications without a warrant. 1) The law enforcement agents who seized the computer on which our electronic communications were stored did not know that there was contained email--despite the fact that the agents had to unhook the computer from the phone lines. 2) A warrant against the provider of the electronic communication service to seize the computer on which our email was stored is sufficient to seize and examine any electronic communications stored within that computer. If this were the case, Congress would have provided an exemption for seizing the computers on which electronic mail is stored. Since they did not, such an exemption will have to be provided by the Courts, or found to be an error in the FBI's interpretation of the law. It is easy to understand the reluctance of one law enforcement agency to investigate another, especially in the small-town, close working conditions of Riverside. But if the FBI will not protect the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens from over-zealous local officials who violate the privacy of electronic communications, who will? COMPLAINT 8 PRAYER WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to represent in this action respectfully pray that this Court enter judgment against defendants: a) That the FBI be ordered by this Court to investigate fully the circumstances herein described involving electronic mail sequestered by law enforcement agents in Riverside County; b) That the U. S. Attorney's office be ordered to either file charges based on the results of the FBI determination of the facts involved, or forthwith provide legal argument acceptable to this Court as to the non-applicability of Title 18, Section 2701 et seq. to this case; c) Plaintiffs' expenses; d) Other relief such as the Court may deem appropriate. Dated: December 9, 1988 H. KEITH HENSON THOMAS K. DONALDSON ROGER E. GREGORY COMPLAINT 9 (Attachments to Henson, Donaldson, and Gregory lawsuit) H. Keith Henson 1794 Cardel Way San Jose, CA 95124 408-978-7616 April 5, 1988 Ron Heller, Supervisor Federal Bureau of Investigation P.O. Box 2317 Riverside, CA 92516 Dear Mr. Heller: Please excuse the delay in getting this material to you per our telephone conversation of last month. My background is in engineering, and, though I have had experience in space law and international human rights, it took some time for me to acquire sufficient understanding of the law in this area to make a clear statement. I believe a serious Federal crime has been committed against me and several others by certain members of the Riverside County Coroner's Office. The statute involved is Title 18, Section 2701, otherwise referenced as Chapter 121, "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access." (1986) The criminal act was the removing of a computer (specifically a Toshiba T300 with a green screen monitor, a Xebec 10 Mbyte hard disk and a modem) used for electronic mail from the Alcor Life Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., in Riverside on January 12 of this year, subsequently preventing authorized access, and (probably) accessing stored electronic mail files on that computer, all without a warrant. I have apprised various members of the coroner's office of the use and content of this particular computer and of the Federal law involved. They seem to have no concern about the legality of their activities. Subsection (a) of 2701, except as provided in subsection (c), details the offence: intentionally accessing an electronic mail facility without authorization, or intentionally exceeding an authorization to access that facility and thereby obtaining or preventing authorized access to a wire or electronic communication. Subsection (c) provides three exceptions for authorized access. Points 1 and 2 under that sub-subsection do not apply, as the coroner's office neither provides electronic communication service, nor are they the intended recipient of the electronic mail in question. Point 3 list three statutes under which law enforcement officials can obtain authorization to access stored electronic mail. Of these, section 2518 is the standard Ron Heller Page 2 April 5, 1988 wire tap regulations. As far as I know, the coroner's office has not obtained a court order which would allow wire tapping or access to my electronic mail. Section 2704 provides for forcing service providers to make backups of electronic mail, (with a warrant) and does not seem applicable either. Section 2703 provides for only one way for law enforcement agencies to access electronic mail stored less than 180 days: a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or an equivalent State warrant. I do not believe that warrants of any kind have been issued which would permit the coroner or his deputies access to my electronic mail on the Alcor computer system. If warrants to this effect have been issued, I have not been informed of them. While the coroner's office has been engaged in an investigation, this is no excuse for a law enforcement agency to break laws by failing to obtain a valid warrant. My reading of the law, and the legislative history behind it, leads me to believe that this particular episode of Fourth Amendment abuse is exactly what Congress had in mind to prevent when it passed Chapter 121. The loss of this computer and our other computers has cause Alcor a great deal of difficulty. (This may have been the primary reason they were taken.) Alcor and its members need the computer in question to be returned to us and put back in service if this is possible. I would like the computer and related equipment returned to Alcor rather than the FBI holding it as evidence. Alcor could make printed copies of the directories and "userlist" to be preserved as evidence. Please let me know if I have made errors in either my reasoning or the events I have described. I will be happy to provide your office with background on any aspects of this matter about which I have knowledge. Sincerely, H. Keith Henson cc C. Ashworth PS I hear the investigation has been turned over to the Riverside Police Department. You might warn them so *they* don't run afoul of Federal Law. Enc. Title 18 USC Sections 2701-2710 ATTACHMENT A -------------------------------------- H. Keith Henson 1794 Cardel Way San Jose, CA 95124 408-978-7616 April 22, 1988 Ron Heller Federal Bureau of Investigation P.O. Box 2317 Riverside, CA 92516 Dear Mr. Heller: I was astounded at the refusal of the FBI to even make minimal inquiry into a citizen`s complaint of a clear violation of a Federal law. Your advice that I take my complaints to Riverside County is hard to fathom; to the best of my knowledge, the county has no laws regarding intercepting electronic mail. Your argument that having an unrelated warrant to take a computer permits interception of the electronic mail of all people who were using that computer would (I think) generate great concern among the staff and members of the House Committee on the Judi- ciary which held extensive hearing on this law only two years ago. Your reluctance to investigate another law enforcement agency is understandable, but if the federal government won`t protect citi- zens from local officials who break Federal laws and violate our Fourth Amendment rights, who will? Sincerely, H. Keith Henson HKH:al cc: John R. Bolton, Asst. Attorney General Rep. George Brown Michael Emick, U. S. Attorney Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr. Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier James Knapp, Asst. Attorney General Rep. N. Mineta Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead Sen. Pete Wilson ATTACHMENT B ---------------------------------- (KH Letterhead) April 25, 1988 Michael Emick Chief of Criminal Complaints U.S. Attorney's Office 312 N. Spring St. Los Angeles, CA 90012 Dear Mr. Emick: This letter is to complain about the refusal of the FBI office in Riverside to investigate a clear violation of Federal law. Mr. Heller did not pass on the enclosed letter to Alka Sagar of your office, and she had no recollection Monday of his verbal arguments for the FBI's inaction. I looked into the legislative history of the particular House Bill which eventually became law and found that James Knapp (who was then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and has since moved to a higher position in the Justice Depart- ment) had a number of things to say about the impending legisla- tion. He was particularly interested in forstalling the need for court orders to obtain access to stored electronic communica- tions. I quote from his written testimony of March 5, 1986 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice: "The authorization to intercept the communications should be accomplished by a statute mandating a judicial authorization based on probable cause akin to that which can now be secured with a Fourth Amendment search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is based on the premise that the interception of electronic mail generally should be accorded no more protection than that accorded to regular mail. At the present time regular mail can be seized with a Rule 41 search warrant. . . . "The search warrant . . . should be based on a sworn affidavit establishing probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is being or is about to be committed. The affidavit and judicial authorization should sufficiently specify the people involved, the facility in question, the specific offenses involved, and the type of information sought to be intercepted. . . ." Congress went along with the Justice Department in requiring search warrants rather than the more cumbersome court orders, with the understanding that they would watch for abuse. Michael Emick -2- April 25, 1988 Now in the case at hand, there was a search warrant, but it was clearly inadaquate to seize electronic mail since it was directed to the computer rather than its contents and the people who put the contents into it. The correct analogy according to Mr. Knapp's testimony would be a search warrant obtained against a private postal service in which all mail in private boxes was confiscated, opened, and read. The search warrant under which the computer was taken was based on incredible half-truth distortions, and simply irrelevent information. For example, the prime item presented under oath to the judge who issued the warrant was verbal testimony about a copy of a receipt for equipment sold to UCLA, shipped to a Florida address, and authorized by an Alcor officer who works at UCLA. In the first place, the coroner's office has no business investigating theft. If they found something suspicious in the course of other investigation, they should have turned it over to the police. In the second place, *taped to the front of that invoice was a canceled check on the officer's account for the full amount on the invoice.* If this isn't perjury, it skates within a hair of it. This may seem to be an unpopular cause to the FBI, but this is the first time (to my knowledge) that a law enforcement agency has violated the provisions of this law. As a result, there is a great deal of interest by a number of people in the electronic mail industry. If local law enforcement officials demonstrate that they can get away with ignoring this law, there may be considerable pressure on Congress to require more stringent provisions for law enforcement agencies to obtain access to electronic communications. If you have any questions, please give me a call. Sincerely, H. Keith Henson HKH:al cc: Christopher Ashworth, Esq. ATTACHMENT C ------------------------------ (KH Lettterhead) April 25, 1988 Representative Norman Mineta 13th District 1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310 San Jose, Ca 95128 Attention: Dorene Giacopini Dear Representative Mineta: I am writing to ask you to intercede with the FBI on behalf of myself and two other San Jose constituents, Thomas K. Donaldson and Roger Gregory. We believe a Federal Law, Section 2701, et seq. of Title 18, was broken by local law enforcement officials in Southern California. We would like you to make a request of the FBI that they determine if this is true, and if it is, ask the U.S. Attorney to file charges. All of us used (and paid for through membership fees) an elec- tronic mail facility owned by the Alcor Life Extension Founda- tion. On January 12 of this year, the computer containing our confidential personal communications was seized by the coroner`s office in Riverside under a warrant issued against Alcor and obtained on the basis of gross distortions. Regardless of the validity of this warrant, <2703 requires a warrant naming the individual whose mail is to be seized, and stating probable cause as to the need to invade the individual`s privacy. No warrants have been issued which would permit these officials to access or deny us access to our electronic mail. The FBI is understandably reluctant to investigate a fellow law enforcement agency. In my first telephone conversation with Ron Heller he strongly discouraged me from complaining. While it may have been inadvertent, his office lost my first letter (sent by Express Mail), did not pass on the enclosed letter to the U.S. Attorney`s office, and suggested (when he called after 5PM last Friday) that my only recourse is to the same local officials who have violated the law. The cited section of law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, and the cases which develop from it are of great interest in Silicon Valley, where the local volume of electronic mail may be approaching that of First Class mail. There is a considerable interest expressed by several computer publications in the case. I can direct the reporters who are calling me to your office if you wish. Sincerely, H. Keith Henson HKH:al ATTACHMENT D --------------------------------- (KH letterhead) April 25, 1988 Senator Pet Wilson 2040 Ferry Building San Francisco, CA 94111 Attention: Lisa Nauman Dear Senator Wilson: (body same as Attachment D) ATTACHMENT E --------------------------------- (KH Letterhead) July 31, 1988 Representative Norman Mineta 13th District 1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310 San Jose, Ca 95128 Dear Representative Mineta: Thank you for pursuing an inquiry for me into the FBI's disinter- est in an apparent violation of the Electronic Communication Pri- vacy Act, and for forwarding a copy of Mr. Floyd Clark's letter. In that letter of June 3, the FBI excused their unwillingness to investigate because the US Attorney declined prosecution. Alka Sagar, the US Attorney in Los Angeles who Mr. Heller told me had made the decision to decline prosecution, based her decision entirely on a short telephone conversation with FBI represen- tative Mr. Heller. When I contacted her on the Monday after Mr. Heller told me that no investigation was going to be made, she told me that my letter to the FBI had not been forwarded. She could not remember either the subject or the reason for declining prosecution. If I could speculate on the conversation, Mr. Heller may have told her he had a case he did not want to work on, and her response may have been something like "Well, if you don't want to work on it, the U.S. Attorney isn't interested." This is hardly an independent evaluation of the merits of my complaint. I then wrote to Michael Emick, Ms. Sagar's boss. He is Chief of Criminal Complaints for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles. One of Mr. Emick's assistants called a week or two later and told me that virtually no cases except those involving large amounts of cocaine are being accepted for prosecution, regardless of the merits. I have received no written response to my letter of April 25 to date (copy enclosed). There may be a need for remedial legislation on electronic pri- vacy. Mr. Heller, a San Jose FBI agent, and two representatives of the District Attorney's office in Riverside all believe that the requirements for obtaining warrants against individuals found in 1986 law can be safely ignored if a warrant can be obtained against the computer on which the electronic mail is stored. They use the analogy that if they obtained a warrant against a Post Office, they could open and read any mail they found within the walls of the Post Office. I doubt this was the intent of Representative Norman Mineta -2- July 31, 1988 Congress, but if it was, the fact would be of great interest in this area. In his closing sentence, Mr. Clark recommends that I contact an attorney to see what civil remedies are available to me. I have already contacted several. I find that while there are pro- visions (Section 2707) for civil actions at law, they are use- less. If a jury found that my privacy rights had indeed been violated, I could be awarded $1,000. The attorneys I have contacted tell me that the case could be made, and likely won, but the cost to do so would start at $100,000 and range upwards of $500,000. If this were an isolated incident, I would feel better about ignoring the decay of civil rights in this area. But recently Riverside county officials used a search warrant to confiscate television news tapes in violation of federal and state laws pro- tecting freedom of the press. Limits on law enforcement activi- ties are as important as limits on criminals. Although it is a lot of trouble for a citizen to oppose high handed law enforce- ment agents, it has to be done to prevent the loss of our rights. I would appreciate your inquiring of the Justice Department what reasoning they used to decline enforcing the law Congress made regarding electronic communications. Perhaps they would respond to a letter from you in less than three months. I know you are sensitive to shortcuts in due process, and I could use your ad- vice on what, if anything, I should do. Sincerely, H. Keith Henson HKH:al ATTACHMENT F ----------------------------------- U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Wahsington, DC 20535 June 27, 1988 Honorable Pete Wilson United States Senator 2040 Ferry Building San Francisco, California 94111 Dear Senator Wilson: Your May 18th inquiry of the Department of Justice on behalf of Mr. H. Keith Henson has been referred to FBI Headquarters. Mr. Henson's concerns have been reviewed both here and by our Los Angeles Office. The facts have been presented to the United States Attorney's Office and prosecution was declined. Mr. Henson has been advised of the declination and that our investigation is closed. It has been suggested to Mr. Henson that he contact an attorney of his choice to pursue possible civil remedies available to him. Sincerely yours, (signed) Floyd I. Clarke Assistant Director Criminal Investigative Division ATTACHMENT G -------------------------------- U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, DC 20530 04 NOV 1988 (stamped date) Honorable Norman Y. Mineta U.S. House of Representatives 1245 South Winchester Blvd., Suite 310 San Jose, California 95128 ATTN: Dorene M. Giacopini Field Representative Dear Congressman Mineta: This is in response to your letter dated September 22, 1988, on behalf of your constituent H. Keith Henson. The Unites States Attorney's office for the Central District of California considered twice whether prosecution was warranted, taking into account the information provided by Mr. Henson. However, there is no competent evidence upon which to base a federal prosecution. Since Mr. Henson's letter addresses a matter courrently being prosecuted by the State of California, this office recommends that you refer Mr. Henson's inquiry to the District Attorney's office, Los Angeles, California. Sincerely, (signed) Thomas M. Boyd (for) Assistant Attorney General ATTACHMENT H ------------------------------ (KH Letterhead) November 9, 1988 Thomas M. Boyd Assistant Attorney General Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, DC 20530 Dear Mr. Boyd: Representative Norman Mineta passed on your undated letter to me responding to his letter of September 22, 1988. It is a violation of federal law (Title 18, Section 2701 et seq.) to seize a person's electronic mail without a warrant against the person's mail. My electronic mail was seized without a warrant being sought against it. Could you tell me how these simple-to- determine facts fail to provide "competent evidence on which to base a federal prosecution." Could you tell me what constitutes "competent evidence" or provide a reference? Could you clarify the last paragraph of your letter. To the best of my knowledge there is nothing related to any letter I have written which is "currently being prosecuted by the State of California" by the District Attorney's office in Los Angeles. If there is, this would be of intense concern. Sincerely H. Keith Henson HKH:al cc Representative Norman Y. Mineta ATTACHMENT I ----------------------------- COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA SEARCH WARRANT (boilerplate, description of place to be searched) . . . for the following property: 1. All electronic storage devices, capable of storing, electronic data regarding the above records, including magnetic tapes, disc (floppy or hard), and the complete hardware necessary to retrieve electronic data including CPU (Central Processing Unit), CRT (viewing screen, disc or tape drive(s), printer, software and service manuals for operation of the said computer, together with all handwritten notes or printed material describing the operation of the computers. (See Exhibit A - Search Warrant No. 1, property to be seized #1) 2 Human body parts identifiable as belonging to the deceased, Dora Kent. 3 Narcotics, controlled substances and other drugs subject to regulation by the Drug Enforcement Administration. (more boilerplate, signiture of Judge) ATTACHMENT J